The U.S.-Proposed “Trusteeship Agreement” for Palestine: The UN-Styled Plan That Could Have Avoided Forcible Displacement of the Palestinian Refugees in 1948 by Boling, Gail J.
The U.S.-Proposed “Trusteeship
Agreement” for Palestine:
The UN-Styled Plan That Could Have
Avoided Forcible Displacement of the
Palestinian Refugees in 1948
Gail J. Boling
Abstract
In this article, the author examines the U.S.-proposed
“Trusteeship Agreement for Palestine,” circulated by the
U.S. in the UN Security Council and in subcommittees of
the General Assembly from March through May of 1948.
The U.S. proposed a UN trusteeship for Palestine as a pos-
sible means to provide for a peaceful transition from the
end of the British Mandate for Palestine into a new go-
vernmental entity that would provide equality under the
law for all of its citizens. Notably, the proposed trusteeship
arrangement would have avoided partition of Palestine.
The author asserts that this, in turn, could have avoided
the forcible displacement of three-quarters of a million Pa-
lestinian refugees in 1948, as well as Israel’s subsequent re-
fusal to repatriate them. The author argues that the
U.S.-proposed Trusteeship Agreement for Palestine sheds
light on important norms of international law that existed
in 1948 and that could, and should, have been followed
by the United Nations in providing for the welfare and le-
gal rights of all the inhabitants of mandate Palestine as
the clock ticked down on the announced British withdra-
wal from Palestine as mandatory authority as of 15 May
1948.
Résumé
Dans cet article, l’auteure examine la proposition intitulée
« Trusteeship Agreement for Palestine » (« Accord de tu-
telle pour la Palestine ») qu’avait fait circuler les États-
Unis au Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies et dans les
sous-comités de l’Assemblée générale pendant la période
allant de mars à mai 1948. Les États-Unis avaient propo-
sé une tutelle des Nations Unies pour la Palestine comme
solution possible pouvant fournir une transition pacifique
entre la fin du mandat britannique sur la Palestine et
l’émergence d’une nouvelle entité gouvernementale qui
aurait garanti l’égalité de tous ses citoyens devant la loi.
En particulier, ce plan de tutelle aurait évité la partition
de la Palestine. L’auteur affirme qu’un tel plan aurait à
son tour évité le déplacement forcé de trois-quarts de mil-
lion de réfugiés palestiniens en 1948, aussi bien que le re-
fus d’Israël par la suite de les rapatrier. L’auteur soutient
que la proposition américaine d’ « Accord de Tutelle des
Nations Unies pour la Palestine » jette la lumière sur des
normes importantes en matière de droit international qui
existaient en 1948 et qui auraient pu, et auraient dû, être
mises en vigueur par les Nations Unies pour garantir le
bien-être et les droits légaux de tous les habitants du man-
dat de la Palestine alors qu’avait commencé le compte à
rebours pour le retrait annoncé de la Grande Bretagne de




his article will examine an important but often over-
looked document that had the potential peacefully to
forestall the outbreak of interstate hostilities in the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict in 1948. This document is the
U.S.-proposed “Trusteeship Agreement for Palestine”1 (he-
reinafter the Trusteeship Agreement), drafted by the U.S.
and circulated first in the UN Security Council and then in
subcommittees of the General Assembly from March
through May of 1948. Had this plan been adopted by the UN
Security Council in a timely manner in 1948, it could quite
possibly have avoided2 or reversed3 the forcible displace-
ment of the Palestinian refugee population in 1948. Conse-
quently, study of the Trusteeship Agreement sheds light on
certain important international law aspects of the Palesti-
nian refugee dilemma, both at its origins and also at the heart
of the current stalemate in the stalled peace negotiations
between the Israelis and the Palestinians.
The Trusteeship Agreement would have legally obliged
United Nations member states to ensure the peaceful tran-
sition of the “British Mandate for Palestine” – which the
British had announced they would terminate on 15 May
1948 – into a newly created entity to be known as the “UN
Trusteeship for Palestine” (hereinafter the Trusteeship).
This new Trusteeship would have been supervised under
the UN Trusteeship Council pursuant to Article 75 of the
Charter of the United Nations.4
The potential impact of the Trusteeship Agreement in
changing the course of history of the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict cannot be underestimated. Had it come into effect,
there would have been no division of mandate Palestine
into more than one state. The government that would have
been set up – under the direct supervision of the United
Nations – would have been a government for all its citizens.
Because it was premised on a peaceful transition of govern-
ment, forcible displacement of habitual residents from the
territory of former mandate Palestine and subsequent refu-
sal to repatriate them simply was not contemplated in the
setting up of such a Trusteeship, nor could it have been
justified under the terms of the Trusteeship Agreement.
This is because the Trusteeship Agreement incorporated
certain fundamental human rights norms that have come
to be recognized as forming the bedrock core of human
rights law today. Seen in this light, the importance of the
Trusteeship Agreement becomes clear. From the viewpoint
of  the Palestinians  who  became  refugees, it  could  have
protected them from forcible displacement and Israel’s
subsequent refusal to repatriate them. From the viewpoint
of the Yishuv – the pre-state, Zionist politically oriented and
immigrant-based leadership operating in Palestine – imple-
mentation of the Trusteeship Agreement would have been
an unmitigated disaster and could well have spelled the end
of the Zionist enterprise. The stakes surrounding the fate of
the Trusteeship Agreement, then, were a “winner takes all”
proposition.
In its most basic outlines, the Trusteeship Agreement
would have instituted a secular and democratic model of
government in all the geographic area of former mandate
Palestine. Thus, “partition” – or separation of the two
peoples, Jewish vs. Palestinian Arab – simply was not con-
templated under Trusteeship. This commitment to geogra-
phic unity alone would have avoided the creation of the
Palestinian refugee population. Under Trusteeship, there
could have been no possible justification for forcible displa-
cement and subsequent refusal to repatriate refugees whose
habitual residences lay inside the geographic boundaries of
the Trusteeship entity. Furthermore, the Trusteeship
Agreement incorporated fundamental human rights prin-
ciples that would have protected Palestinians, including:
democratic rule through the ballot;5 equality under the law
for all citizens of the Trusteeship; protection of property
rights for all citizens of the Trusteeship; and a secular
government, following the U.S. model of “separation of
church (religion) and state.” A tripartite system of govern-
ment was proposed, with legislative, judicial, and executive
branches.
Review of the Trusteeship Agreement, then, is not mere
hypothetical speculation about what “might have been” or
an idle exercise in “rewriting history” for purely conjectural
reasons. Rather, the analysis is important because it provi-
des an actual historical example of a governmental model
that was actually proposed at the highest levels of the United
Nations and could have been used for the peaceful transi-
tion of mandate Palestine into a new governmental entity
– Trusteeship – which in turn was intended to lead to full
self-government or independence. This model is critically
important because it was drafted within the framework of
the United Nations system and consciously incorporated
fundamental norms of the United Nations human rights
regime existing in 1948 to define the contours of the type
of government envisioned for post-mandate Palestine.
Thus the Trusteeship Agreement serves as a standard-set-
ting model that incorporates 1948 legal norms that should
have guided the fate of post-mandate Palestine.
Viewing the issue in terms of the present-day impasse
facing negotiations between the Israelis and the Palesti-
nians, analysts on both sides of the table agree unanimously
that if a solution to the Palestinian refugee problem could
be found, then a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
could be found. Israel’s refusal to offer the choice of volun-
tary repatriation to the 1948 refugees and their descendants
remains the most intractable of the so-called “final status”
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issues still on the negotiating table between the Israelis and
the Palestinians today.
Does the past hold any keys to solving the perplexing
dilemma of the Palestinian refugee question, which has
such monumental consequences for achieving peace and
stability in the Middle East in these troubled times? Do the
legal norms incorporated into the 1948 UN Trusteeship
Agreement for Palestine offer any guidelines or
benchmarks that could be used in mapping out a solution
to the Palestinian refugee question today?
This article will attempt to suggest some possible answers
to these questions. First, a brief survey of the history leading
up to the official U.S. proposal for the Trusteeship Agree-
ment will be presented. Then, the more salient features of
the Trusteeship government itself will be examined. Then
the Trusteeship proposal will be examined in light of light
of international law. It will then be possible to arrive at some
concluding observations.
II. Historical Background
The Covenant of the League of Nations: Mandates as a
“Sacred Trust of Civilization”
To understand the particularities of the British mandate for
Palestine, established in 1922, it is first necessary to review
the  mandates scheme devised by the League of Nations
following World War I and set out in the 1919 Covenant of
the League of Nations (hereinafter the Covenant).6 The
victorious allied powers envisioned a scheme of “adminis-
tering” various colonies that had previously been under the
control of Germany and Turkey until their defeat during the
war. Three classes of mandates were envisioned: “Class A,”
“Class B,” and “Class C” mandates. The “Class A” mandates
were intended for the most “developed” peoples, which were
therefore deemed capable of achieving independence the
soonest. “Class B” mandates were for “less developed” peo-
ples, and “Class C” mandates were for the “least developed”
peoples. The League of Nations envisaged that “Class A”
mandates would achieve full independence first, followed by
the “Class B” mandates, and then by the “Class C” mandates.
However, no specific timetables or “road maps” for achie-
ving independence were laid out in the Covenant.7
Article 22(4) of the Covenant contains the language that
specifically addresses the sovereignty rights of peoples un-
der “Class A” mandates. The language defining the legal
contours of the mandate concept generally is contained in
the first four paragraphs of Article 22, which read as follows:
Article 22:
To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of
the late war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States
which formerly governed them and which are inhabited by
peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous
conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the
principle that the well-being and development of such peoples
form a sacred trust of civilization and that securities for the
performance of this trust should be embodied in this Covenant.
The best method of giving practical effect to this principle
is that  the  tutelage  of such peoples should  be entrusted to
advanced nations who by reason of their resources, their expe-
rience or their geographical position can best undertake this
responsibility, and who are willing to accept it, and that this
tutelage should be exercised by them as Mandatories on behalf
of the League.
The character of the mandate must differ according to the
stage of the development of the people, the geographical situa-
tion of the territory, its economic conditions and other similar
circumstances.
Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish
Empire have reached a stage of development where their exist-
ence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized sub-
ject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by
a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone. The
wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in
the selection of the Mandatory. [emphasis added]8
There are three main points to be made here. First, the
mandates system was envisaged, as early as 1919, as a “sacred
trust of civilization.” The legal concept of “trust” (or trus-
teeship) in Anglo-Saxon common law is specifically invoked
in Article 22 in paragraphs 1 and 2, through use of the words
“sacred trust,” “securities for the performance of this trust,”
“tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted,” and “advanced
nations [undertake the tutelage]… on behalf of the League.”
According to the Anglo-Saxon common-law under-
standing of “trust” in property and estate law (equity), a
“trustee” who is charged with custodial responsibilities for
managing property that belongs to one party (the “gran-
tor”) for the benefit of another party (the “beneficiary”)
does not (and legally cannot) acquire actual ownership of
that property (the “corpus” of the trust). Rather, the trustee
has strict obligations to manage the property responsibly
and can be held legally liable for mismanagement. The
management responsibilities of the trustee are known as
“fiduciary” duties and the duty of care is extremely high.
There are very few circumstances in which mismanagement
or waste by a trustee is excused by common law courts.9
The use of the “trust” language in Article 22 of the
Covenant is significant for this reason. Britain was obliga-
ted to perform its trust obligations under any League of
Nations mandate in a responsible fashion, so as not to
violate its strict common law fiduciary duties as “trustee.”
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The “property” in  this  case is  the concept of “national
sovereignty” of the local inhabitants of the mandated terri-
tory, whose sovereignty rights were to be temporarily “ma-
naged” by the mandatory “trustee” until full independence
would be achieved.10 Article 22 makes it clear that the
mandates are a “trust” arrangement in which the “benefi-
ciaries” are the peoples of the mandated territories them-
selves.11 Britain’s “fiduciary duties” and strict duty of care
becomes significant when analyzing its decision to incor-
porate the Balfour Declaration into the British Mandate for
Palestine (see below).
The second point to be made here is that Article 22(4)
specifically refers to the geographical area that formerly had
been occupied by the Turkish Empire. This area, which
included Palestine, was ultimately divided into five separate
mandate areas – Palestine, Trans-Jordan, Lebanon, Syria,
and Iraq – all of which were denominated “Class A” man-
dates because they were deemed to be the most ready to
achieve their full sovereign independence and were expec-
ted to do so sooner than the “Class B” or “Class C” manda-
tes. Of the five “Class A” mandates, Palestine was the only
one that did not achieve the full sovereign independence
promised to it in Article 22(4). Iraq achieved independence
first, in 1932, when it was admitted to the League of Nations.
Jordan achieved independence in 1946. The French mandates
over Syria and Lebanon ended during World War II.
At least one author has disputed the clarity of the geo-
graphical reference contained in Article 22(4), arguing that
use of the words “certain communities” – without speci-
fying exactly which ones – is vague and leaves open the
possibility that not all “communities formerly belonging to
the Turkish Empire” were “provisionally recognized” as
“independent nations.” That commentator argues that Pa-
lestine was the exception, and that the local indigenous
inhabitants of Palestine did not receive provisional recog-
nition in Article 22(4) of their status as an independent
nation because of the vagueness of the wording.12 However,
this argument fails to address the fact that Palestine was
expressly grouped in the “Class A” mandates by the League
of Nations along  with all  the  other territories formerly
occupied by the Ottoman Turks. Since there is no language
in Article 22(4) to separate Palestine out for disparate treat-
ment, it should logically be considered to have been inclu-
ded in the Covenant’s provisional recognition of
sovereignty as an independent nation.
The Balfour Declaration: Propriety of Incorporation into
the British Mandate for Palestine
The third point to be made concerns the Balfour Declara-
tion, which preceded the drafting of the Covenant of the
League of Nations. The Balfour Declaration was a letter
written in 1917 by Britain’s Foreign Secretary, Arthur Bal-
four, to a prominent leader of the Zionist movement, Lord
Rothschild, stating that Britain would “view with favour the
establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish
people.”13 The Balfour Declaration was a letter written by a
representative of the British government to a private person
and therefore could not be considered binding upon any
other states (and some Britons questioned whether it could
even be considered  binding  upon Britain). Importantly,
however, the Balfour Declaration did contain a “savings
clause” which preserved the rights of the local, indigenous
inhabitants of Palestine: “it being clearly understood that
nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and
religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Pa-
lestine.”14
In contrast, the Covenant of the League of Nations, as
discussed above, was an agreement made between states
two years later, in 1919. The Covenant served as the juridi-
cal basis for the mandates which the League subsequently
set up. Britain, which ultimately assumed the mandate for
Palestine in 1922, did so subject to the express terms of the
Covenant. Thus, Article 22 of the Covenant must serve as
the benchmark for measuring Britain’s performance of its
fiduciary trust obligations to the “beneficiaries” of the Co-
venant trust, i.e., the local indigenous inhabitants of Pales-
tine. Britain notably acted against this people’s interests by
incorporating the terms of the Balfour Declaration into the
British Mandate for Palestine in 1922.15 It can be argued that
Britain’s actions in so doing were ultra vires to the express
terms of Article 22 of the Covenant. Indeed, the Palestinian
Arab population was quite vocal about its opposition to the
incorporation of the Balfour Declaration into the British
Mandate for Palestine and persistently questioned the lega-
lity of this incorporation throughout the twenty-five years
that Britain served as the mandatory authority. The histo-
rical record is replete with examples of the Palestinian Arab
population raising legal challenges to this incorporation
and the Yishuv preferring to avoid having these challenges
heard by bodies capable of making a conclusive legal
judgment.16
Britain essentially attempted to do the impossible. On
the one hand, it attempted to satisfy the fiduciary require-
ments of the Covenant, which entailed safeguarding the
sovereignty rights of the local indigenous population over
whom it had assumed mandatory authority. That is why the
terms of the British Mandate for Palestine included nume-
rous “savings clauses,” intended to protect this people’s
rights.17 However, on the other hand, Britain gave the wink
and nod to another group of people – notably immigrants
from outside the region – and gave them permission to
settle in Palestine to create a new society or “homeland”
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(which the immigrant population interpreted as permis-
sion to try to establish their own state). The indigenous
population never accepted the notion that the immigrants
could set up their own state at the expense of the rights of
the indigenous population.
Twenty-Five Years Later, Britain Announces Withdrawal
from Palestine: What Will Fill the Gap?
For twenty-five years – from 1922 to 1947 – Britain played
the game of trying to square the circle by attempting to
satisfy the political demands of two different groups compe-
ting over the same territory. Eventually, however, realizing
the impossibility of such a proposition, Britain threw up its
hands in despair and in April 1947 announced its intention
of withdrawing as mandatory authority in Palestine (origi-
nally giving an exit date of 1 August 1948, but subsequently
moving the exit date up to 15 May 1948). This threw the matter
of devising a substitute government structure for Palestine
squarely into the purview of the United Nations.
General Assembly Recommends “Partition” of Palestine –
29 November 1947
The United Nations General Assembly initially proposed in
November 1947 that Palestine be “partitioned,” in effect
proposing to cut the proverbial Solomonic baby in half. On
29 November 1947, the General Assembly adopted Resolu-
tion 181,18 known as the “Partition Resolution,” which re-
commended dividing mandatory Palestine into two states,
which were inaccurately denominated the “Jewish state” and
“Arab state.”19 However, the General Assembly has only
recommendatory powers under Articles 10, 11, and 14 of the
Charter of the United Nations.20 Only Security Council
resolutions can bind UN member states. Therefore Resolu-
tion 181 never could, and never purported to, convey sove-
reign title to any part of mandatory Palestine to any party.21
Furthermore, the term “Jewish state” was actually a
misnomer. In fact, the (misnamed) “Jewish state” would
have had rough demographic parity between Jews and
Arabs, under the terms of the Partition Plan, with a popu-
lation of 499,020  Jews and  509,780 Palestinian Arabs.22
Thus importantly, and contrary to popular belief, the Par-
tition Resolution never proposed that Jews should consti-
tute a demographic majority in the (misnamed) “Jewish
state.”
Finally, consistent with all the major legal instruments
that had preceded it – i.e., the Balfour Declaration, the
British Mandate for Palestine, and, of course, the Covenant
of the League of Nations (which, as has already been dis-
cussed, is the cornerstone of the entire mandate enterprise
and is, therefore, the most authentic and valid of the three
instruments listed) – the Partition Resolution also contai-
ned “savings clauses” that were intended to protect the
rights of the indigenous Palestinian inhabitants in the geo-
graphical area that was proposed for the (misnamed) “Je-
wish state.”23 Failure by the General Assembly to include
such “savings clauses” would have run directly counter to
the principles of equal rights and non-discrimination
which featured so prominently in Articles 1(2) and 1(3) of
the 1945 Charter of the United Nations, by which all mem-
bers states of the United Nations were bound. (The rele-
vance of the UN Charter to the final acts of the drama
played out in Palestine is discussed below, in Section IV.)
Upon Reconsideration, the U.S. Backtracks on
“Partition”: Trusteeship Is Proposed
As soon as the General Assembly passed the Partition Reso-
lution in November 1947, violent unrest erupted in Pales-
tine. The Jewish Agency, on behalf of the Yishuv, accepted
the Partition Plan. The local indigenous Palestinian popula-
tion (who comprised the overwhelming majority of inhabi-
tants at that time) rejected it. In such a scenario, “partition”
could only be imposed forcibly and against the will of the
majority of inhabitants. The Yishuv opted to use force to try
to impose partition.
The Yishuv apparently hoped to be able to create a state
in which Jews would constitute a demographic majority –
a notion which ran expressly counter to the provisions of
the Partition Plan (as discussed above). Benny Morris and
other “revisionist” historians have meticulously documen-
ted – using material from the official Israeli state archives –
that the various militias of the Yishuv embarked upon
systematic and premeditated military campaigns in the
early months of 1948 deliberately designed to depopulate
Palestinian villages and urban centres in the geographic
area that had been designated in the Partition Plan for the
(misnamed) “Jewish state.”24 As noted in endnotes 3 and 4,
to the opening paragraphs of this article, some 300,000
Palestinians had been forcibly displaced from their homes
of origin as a result of these military campaigns even before
the provisional government of Israel unilaterally declared
its independence on 14 May 1948, which is when interstate
hostilities broke out. By the time the armistice agreements
were concluded in 1949, some three-quarters of a million
Palestinian refugees had been forcibly displaced from their
homes of origin in the territory that would become the state
of Israel. These expulsions were the result of preplanned
military campaigns that under today’s rubric would likely
be termed “ethnic cleansing,” since they were designed to
manipulate the ethnic demographic composition of what
would become the state of Israel.
In the face of  these violent  disturbances,  the United
States itself quickly backtracked on the Partition Resolu-
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tion. The U.S. realized the legal and practical impossibility
of dividing mandate Palestine into two states against the
wishes of the local indigenous Palestinian population wi-
thout resorting to bloodshed.
Notably, the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff
reported to the U.S. Secretary of State as early as 19 January
1948 that imposition of the partition plan by force would
appear to violate the Palestinians’ right to self-determina-
tion under international law.25 Regrettably, this same 19
January memo also expressly recommended that the U.S.
administration deliberately block any attempt to submit the
question of the legality vel non of partition to the Interna-
tional Court of Justice.26 Such a call had been made many
times by UN delegates in the various UN debates leading
up to the adoption of the General Assembly’s Partition
Resolution.
The U.S. Submits Its Trusteeship Proposal to the
UN Security Council – 19 March 1948
On 19 March 1948, Warren Austin, the U.S. ambassador to
the UN, announced to the UN Security Council that the U.S.
– after viewing the facts on the ground in Palestine (referring
to the militia warfare then currently raging) – deemed “par-
tition” of Palestine to be totally impossible to implement
without resort to force  of arms.27 Accordingly, the U.S.
recommended to the Security Council that the General
Assembly be asked to institute a provisional Trusteeship for
the whole territory of mandate Palestine, under which the
two communities would live together under a single “Go-
vernment of Palestine” until a mutually satisfactory final
agreement could be achieved. Under the U.S.-proposed
Trusteeship Agreement, the United Nations itself, acting
through its Trusteeship Council established under Article 75
of the Charter of the United Nations,28 would have consti-
tuted the “Administering Authority for Palestine,” thereby
replacing Britain as the mandatory authority.
On 19 March 1948, the U.S. circulated a summary of the
main principles of the proposed Trusteeship Agreement to
other members of the Security Council. These summarized
principles were released to the public as a “digest” on 5 April
1948 and published in the press  on  6 April  1948.  The
principles are reproduced as an Annex to a pamphlet dated
16  April  1948  that the  Jewish Agency  prepared  for the
special session of the General Assembly convened at the
request of the U.S. to discuss the political future of Palestine
(see below).29 The “digest” of principles comprise 15
points.30
The political and diplomatic whirlwind that the U.S.
initiated on 19 March 1948 was like opening a Pandora’s
box. The U.S. had acted at the highest levels of the UN – as
a permanent member of the Security  Council – to  call
openly for a complete UN policy reversal on the idea of
partition for Palestine. Most importantly, the U.S. was
openly calling into question the legality of partition. The
debate, outcry, and political fallout reverberated throu-
ghout the entire world. The diplomatic record – both from
the UN internal records, and from the capitals of nations
around the globe – is voluminous.31
The Jewish Agency and Zionist Circles React with
Alarm to Trusteeship
The Jewish Agency reacted with extreme alarm to the Trus-
teeship proposal. Their opposition was quite openly based
upon the perception that the proposed Trusteeship arran-
gement would have: (1) avoided partition;32 (2) instituted a
democratic electoral form of government in Palestine (ma-
jority rule);33 (3) resulted, in all probability, in the restriction
of future immigration to Palestine;34 and (4) provided pro-
tection for local, indigenous landowners.35
U.S. Internal Disagreement over Trusteeship: Legal vs.
Pragmatic Considerations
The U.S. State Department – staffed with legal experts – was
the strongest proponent of Trusteeship. In contrast, the
executive and congressional branches faced political pressu-
res that weighed against Trusteeship. As the State Depart-
ment saw it, since partition was legally and pragmatically not
possible, Trusteeship was a viable alternative that could buy
time until a peaceful settlement of the conflict could be
achieved. On the other hand, the White House was facing a
tough election that year and did not want to alienate that
segment of U.S. domestic opinion that favoured partition.
A series of opinion polls were taken in February 1948 in
order to gauge domestic sensitivities on the issue.36
Weighing against the influence of domestic proponents of
partition, there was a natural countervailing domestic reluc-
tance to commit U.S. ground troops37 to Palestine to imple-
ment partition. Thus pragmatic military analysis reinforced
the legal view  that  partition was  unworkable. The State
Department view – that Trusteeship was the most likely
option to buy time until a peaceful (and therefore legal)
resolution to the conflict could be found – won out.
As debate in the Security Council and on the U.S. domes-
tic front swirled on, the clock was ticking. The British had
announced unequivocally that they intended to withdraw
as mandatory power by 15 May 1948 and they had absolu-
tely no intention of staying on, even in a newly transformed
role as “Trusteeship Administrator.” As already noted abo-
ve, the militias of the Yishuv were engaged in a full-scale
systematic campaign aimed at “pacifying” and depopula-
ting Palestinian population centres in the area designated
in the Partition Plan as being for the (misnamed) “Jewish
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State.” The Jewish Agency made no effort to hide the effects
of the Yishuv militias’ anti-Palestinian depopulation mili-
tary campaigns and referred to their effects as support for
the proposition that partition was already “irreversible.”38
The U.S. Submits Its Trusteeship Proposal to a Special
Session of the General Assembly, Convened to Discuss the
Future of Palestine – 16 April 1948
On 1  April 1948, the  Security Council, on  U.S. urging,
passed a resolution requesting the Secretary-General to con-
vene a special session of the General Assembly to “consider
further the question of the future government of Pales-
tine,”39 and specifically its proposed trusteeship agreement.
On 16 April 1948, the UN General Assembly convened in
special session to discuss the U.S. proposal for a provisional
trusteeship for Palestine.
It was at this 16 April 1948 special session of the General
Assembly that the U.S. officially presented a more fleshed-
out version of the its proposed Trusteeship Agreement –
some forty-seven articles long.40
The U.S.-proposed Trusteeship Agreement had received
input from a wide variety of domestic sources, primarily
from the executive branch, including: the State Depart-
ment, and in particular the Department of Near Eastern
Affairs; the National Security Council; the Joint Chiefs of
Staff; the Policy Planning Staff; and President Harry Tru-
man himself, who gave official approval to the final ver-
sion.41
Significantly, the Trusteeship for Palestine proposed by
the U.S. would have established a secular, democratic trus-
teeship government with a bicameral legislature compri-
sing a “Senate” and a “House of Representatives.”42 It also
would have provided for an independent judiciary, inclu-
ding a “Supreme Court.”43 The executive functions would
have been carried out by a “Governor-General,”44 who
would have been appointed by the UN Trusteeship Coun-
cil.  (More specific details of the U.S. draft Trusteeship
Agreement are discussed in the next section, below.)
The General Assembly submitted the U.S.-proposed
Trusteeship Agreement as a “working paper” to its “First
Committee,” charged with considering matters relating to
“Disarmament and International Security.” On 20 April
1948, at its 118th meeting, the General Assembly’s First
Committee officially embarked upon debate of the U.S.-
proposed Trusteeship Agreement. At the 120th meeting of
the First Committee, on 21 April 1948, the U.S. introduced
a resolution recommending referral of the U.S.-proposed
Trusteeship Agreement to the General Assembly’s Fourth
Committee, charged with considering matters falling under
the heading “Special Political and Decolonization” (inclu-
ding Trusteeship); however, this recommended was not
adopted. Following a period of general debate, the First
Committee decided at its 128th meeting to embark upon a
detailed discussion of the U.S.-proposed Trusteeship
Agreement for Palestine, concentrating on a list of specific
sub-topics. The First Committee was to meet a total of
twenty-five times during the special session of the General
Assembly convened to discuss the question of the future
government of Palestine. During the course of its work, the
First Committee divided into two subcommittees, to deli-
berate upon specific aspects of the issue.
The Clock Runs out on a Peaceful Transition from
Mandate to Trusteeship
As is plainly evident, time weighed heavily against adoption
of the Trusteeship Agreement. With the British-announced
withdrawal date from Palestine of 15 May 1948, the General
Assembly had less than one month – from 20 April 1948 –
to devise a  way to construct  an entirely new system of
government for Palestine, which would be considered an
exceedingly short timetable even in today’s digital environ-
ment. Furthermore, the intense militia warfare raging in
Palestine did not whet the appetite of any member state of
the United Nations to volunteer for peacekeeping duties in
the area to help ensure a peaceful transition from mandate
to Trusteeship. The clock was ticking, and the Yishuv militias
kept up the military pressure to try to impose partition by
force.
In the critical weeks that followed, the discussions about
Trusteeship ground on in General Assembly committee
and subcommittee debates. Meanwhile, the militia warfare
raged on, and the Security Council issued a string of reso-
lutions calling for peace in the area. On 1 April 1948, the
Security Council unanimously passed a resolution45 calling
for a truce between the Yishuv and Palestinian Arab com-
munities in Palestine. In similar fashion, Security Council
Resolution 46 of 17 April  1948 likewise called for “the
immediate cessation of acts of violence in Palestine, and
[the] establish[ment of] conditions of peace and order in
that country.”46 Security Council Resolution 48 of 23 April
1948 followed up by establishing a truce commission in
Palestine.47 Finally, on 14 May 1948, the General Assembly
passed a resolution48 recommending the appointment of an
official  United  Nations mediator in  Palestine, to try  to
resolve the dispute between the Yishuv and the indigenous
Palestinian population.
However, by 14 May 1948, the clock had finally run out.
While discussion of the U.S.-proposed Trusteeship Agree-
ment had wound its complex way through numerous Ge-
neral Assembly committee and subcommittee debates, no
final agreement had been reached. Meanwhile, the Yishuv
seized the initiative and unilaterally declared the inde-
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pendence of the (provisional) state of Israel on 14 May
1948, one day before the British were officially scheduled to
withdraw. Interstate hostilities broke out, and the chance
for a peaceful transition from mandate to Trusteeship was
lost forever.
The UN Security Council reacted to Israel’s 14 May 1948
unilateral declaration of independence by issuing a string
of resolutions calling for truces and cessation of hostilities.49
It  is  clear from this response that the Security  Council
preferred a peaceful transition from mandate and not a
violent partition of Palestine or forcible displacement of its
habitual residents.
Thus, review of the historical record reveals that from a
legal perspective, the UN Security Council, the highest
policy-setting body for the United Nations, clearly rejected
partition of Palestine, as proposed in Resolution 181. Ra-
ther, as early as March and April of 1948, the Security
Council and the General Assembly were jointly engaged in
seeking a peaceful transition from mandate to Trusteeship,
for all of Palestine.
III. The Trusteeship Agreement Itself
Key Characteristics of the U.S.-Proposed Trusteeship
Agreement
The U.S.-proposed Trusteeship Agreement for Palestine was
premised  on several  key legal concepts which today are
recognized as forming the bedrock core of human rights law.
This was in conformity both with the standards embedded
in the 1945 Charter of the United Nations, as well as the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which then curren-
tly being drafted and which was finally adopted a mere nine
months later by the General Assembly in December 1948.
(Section IV, below, will address the international law aspects
of the Trusteeship Agreement.)
Due to limitations of space, it is not possible to reproduce
the entire text of the U.S.-proposed Trusteeship Agreement
here, nor is it necessary for purposes of this discussion. For
interested readers, however, it is available on the internet.50
Rather, for purposes of this article, it is more useful to
highlight the most important features of the U.S.-proposed
Trusteeship Agreement. Six points are of particular impor-
tance. They are summarized below, with cross-references
to their original source in the Trusteeship Agreement itself:
(1) Territorial Unity: Under Trusteeship, Palestine
would not be partitioned into two states but instead
would continue to exist as a single geographic and
political entity  under a new form of government
called Trusteeship. (Trusteeship Agreement, Pream-
ble and Article 5, “Territorial Integrity.”)51
(2) “Majority Rule” Democracy: The Trusteeship entity
would follow a democratic system of government.
Specifically, the democratic principle of “majority
rule,” premised on “one person, one vote,” would
prevail. (Article 20, “Legislature,” and “Article 21,
“Elections to the Legislature.”)52
(3) Equality under the Law for all Citizens: The Trus-
teeship Agreement proposed equality under the law
for all its citizens. No de jure discrimination whatsoe-
ver was contemplated, whether “positive” discrimi-
nation or “negative” discrimination. (Article 9,
“Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms, ex-
cerpted below. Also, Article 32, “Educational System
and Cultural and Benevolent Institutions.”)53
(4) Citizenship for All Habitual Residents of Palestine: No
ethnic demographic manipulation of any kind was
contemplated under Trusteeship. The Trusteeship
for Palestine was to be a government for all its citi-
zens. Forcible displacement of habitual residents
from Palestine and subsequent refusal to repatriate
them was simply not even contemplated under the
Trusteeship Agreement. Such actions simply could
not be justified under the human rights protections
incorporated into the Trusteeship Agreement. (See
Article 8, on “Citizenship,” reproduced in full be-
low.)
(5) Protection of Rights of Tenant Farmers: Specific pro-
visions were included to protect the land rights of
local, indigenous tenant farmers. (See Article 31, on
“Land Policy,” reproduced in full below.)
(6) Limited Immigration to Palestine: Immigration to Pa-
lestine was to be limited by quotas for a period of
several years and would  be limited by Palestine’s
absorptive capacity. (Article 29, “Immigration.”)54
In viewing the relevance of the Trusteeship Agreement
from the perspective of the Palestinian refugees who were
forcibly displaced by the Yishuv militias and subsequently
denied re-entry by the state of Israel, the Trusteeship
Agreement’s article on citizenship is perhaps the most
significant (since Israel bases much of its legal argument
against repatriation of the Palestinian refugees on
grounds of “citizenship”55):
Article 8. Citizenship
Without prejudice to the provisions of legislation which may
subsequently be enacted in Palestine, the following categories
of persons shall be regarded as citizens of Palestine:
(1) Persons resident in Palestine on 1 July 1947, who were not on
that date nationals of any State outside of Palestine;
(2)  Persons resident in  Palestine  on 1 July  1947, who were
nationals on that date of a State outside of Palestine, if they have
filed with the Government of Palestine at any time before 1
November 1948 a declaration, in such form as may be provided
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by the Government of Palestine, that they renounce their for-
mer nationality in favour of Palestinian citizenship.
(3) Persons who have resided in Palestine for three months and
who, while continuing to be residents of Palestine, file with the
Government of Palestine a declaration that they renounce the
nationality of any State outside of Palestine of which they may
be nationals, and take an oath of allegiance to the Government
of Palestine;
(4) Children of Palestinian citizens, wherever born (provided
such children have not at birth or subsequently acquired the
nationality of a State outside of Palestine). [emphasis added]56
In viewing the relevance of the Trusteeship Agreement
from the perspective of the Palestinian refugees whose en-
tire landholdings and property were subsequently confisca-
ted by the state of Israel and turned over for exclusive use
by Jewish citizens of the state of Israel,57 the Trusteeship
Agreement’s nine clauses on “Fundamental Human Rights
and Freedoms” – of which clauses (2), (3), and (5) are most
relevant to the issue of non-discrimination with respect to
property rights – are also extremely important:
Article 9. Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms
. . .
Article 9(2): No discrimination of any kind on grounds of race,
religion, language or sex shall be made against any person in
Palestine.
Article 9(3): All persons in Palestine shall be entitled to equal
protection of the laws.
. . .
Article 9(5): No person or property within Palestine shall be
subject to search or seizure except according to legal process.58
Concerning the protection of the land rights of local, indi-
genous farmers, the Trusteeship Agreement contained Arti-
cle 31, titled “Land Policy,” which read as follows:
Article 31. Land Policy
1. The Governor-General shall establish and maintain a land
system appropriate to the needs of Palestine, in which there shall
be no limitation on the sale, purchase, lease or use of land which
discriminates on grounds of race, nationality, community or
creed. However, under the authority of the Governor-General,
adequate measures shall be taken to assure protection for the
interests of small owners or tenants in cases of transfer of arable
or grazing lands.
2. The Governor-General shall appoint a commission of impar-
tial experts, who shall be neither Arab nor Jew, to recommend
the criteria upon which the land system described in paragraph
1 shall be based.59
Thus the governmental model suggested by the U.S. in its
proposed Trusteeship Agreement envisioned the creation
through peaceful means of a secular, democratic govern-
ment in all of Palestine whose entire community of inhabi-
tants would have enjoyed full equality under the law.
IV. The Trusteeship Agreement Viewed in Light
of International Law
The Legal Principles of “Trust” and Fiduciary Duties of
the “Trustee” Were Continued from the Mandate
Concept and Expanded into Trusteeship
The notion of “trust” that was well-enough developed under
the Covenant of the League of Nations mandate system
received even greater emphasis under the proposed Trus-
teeship system.
The United Nations trusteeship system was set up under
Chapter XII and XIII of the Charter of the United Nations,
which provide for UN supervision and administration of
certain territories placed under the trusteeship regime. Un-
der Article 77 of the Charter, it was envisioned that former
League of Nations mandates that had not terminated by the
dissolution of the League of Nations, in 1946, would natu-
rally come within the trusteeship system.60 However, the
process was not automatic, since the consent of the admi-
nistering state was required under Article 79 of the Charter.
Under the new UN’s new trusteeship system, Article 73
of the UN Charter unambiguously stated that “the interests
of the inhabitants of these [trust] territories are paramount”
[emphasis added].61 The inhabitants of the territories were
clearly the intended “beneficiaries” of the trusteeship sys-
tem, and, accordingly, the “fiduciary” obligations of the
administering “trustee” authorities were made stricter.
Among the “basic objectives” of the Trusteeship system
as stated in Article 76 of the UN Charter are:
Article 76(b): to promote the political, economic, social and
educational advancement of the inhabitants of the trust territo-
ries, and their progressive development towards self-government
or independence as may be appropriate to the particular cir-
cumstances of each territory and its peoples and the freely
expressed wishes of the peoples concerned…
Article 76(c): to encourage respect for human rights and for
fundamental freedoms for all without distinctions as to race, sex,
language, or religion…. [emphasis added].62
It must be noted that the UN has achieved a fairly good
track record as far as securing the eventual independence
of all the other “Class A” mandates (apart from Palestine),
as well as all the other “Class B” and “Class C” mandates
that were transformed into UN trusteeships. As has already
been noted, above, all four of the other “Class A” mandates
had already achieved full independence by the end of World
War II, so there was no need to transform any of them into
UN trusteeships. Notably, of the other “Class B” and “Class
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C” mandates that were converted to UN trusteeships, all did
gain self-government and independence under internatio-
nal supervision.63
Thus Palestine is the clear exception to the established
pattern. The fact that Palestine did not convert to Trus-
teeship and eventually achieve independence indicates that
the League of Nations’ and UN’s intended goals and pur-
poses were subverted.
Trusteeship Viewed under International Law: UN
Charter Norms
There are three primary norms of the Charter of the United
Nations that are particularly relevant to analysis of the U.S.-
proposed Trusteeship Agreement for Palestine. All three are
found in Article 1 of the Charter, which states the fundamen-
tal “purposes” of the United Nations.
The first principle is equality under the law, which has as
its corollary the prohibition against discrimination. This
principle is stated in two places: Article 1(2)64 and Article
1(3).65 The second principle is self-determination of peo-
ples. This principle is stated in Article 1(2).66 These purpo-
ses are repeated in Articles 5567 and 5668 of the Charter.
The third principle is the prohibition against aggression,
and its corollary, the inadmissibility of the acquisition of
territory by force. This principle is stated in Article 1(1).69
This third principle receives reinforcement from Article 2
of the Charter, which states how Member States will act to
achieve the purposes stated in Article 1.70
Having already examined previously in this article the
sharp differences in outcome between partition and Trus-
teeship, it seems rather self-evident that partition violated
all three of the above-stated principles. Trusteeship, on the
other hand, held out the possibility of conforming with all
three of the above-stated principles.
Furthermore, Article 76 of the Charter, as was discussed
in the preceding section, spells out the specific purposes of
the UN Trusteeship system itself. The two principles which
are most relevant to analysis of the U.S.-proposed Trus-
teeship for Palestine include promotion of “self-govern-
ment or independence” of peoples, stated in Article 76(b),
and respect for “human rights” and “fundamental free-
doms,” stated in Article 76(c).
It is therefore noteworthy that the U.S.-proposed Trus-
teeship Agreement for Palestine specifically concluded with
Article 47, on “Termination of Trusteeship.” This article
specifically laid out the “road map” to independence for
Palestine, even though no specific timetable was given.71
Therefore, on this point as well, the Trusteeship is much
more in conformity with Charter norms that partition.
Finally, Article 8072 of the Charter of the United Nations
specifically stated that the UN, as successor organization to
the League of Nations, did not have the legal capacity to
alter to the detriment of indigenous peoples any obligations
that had been made to them by its predecessor organiza-
tion, the League of Nations. Consequently, any attempt by
the UN to alter the terms of the Palestine Mandate to the
detriment of the Palestinian people (which the Partition
Plan  clearly proposed doing) would  be  contrary to the
Charter of the United Nations. Once again, Trusteeship
proves to be the model more in conformity with the pur-
pose and goals of the United Nations than partition.
Trusteeship Viewed under International Law: The
Universal Declaration of Human Rights
The U.S.-proposed Trusteeship Agreement – and most im-
portantly, its very significant differences from the General
Assembly’s Partition Plan, which had preceded it – must be
read in light of the fact that during that exact same period
(1947–48), one of the most important human rights instru-
ments ever drafted – the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights73 (hereinafter UDHR) – was being prepared and
reviewed by the UN General Assembly. The Trusteeship
Agreement itself incorporates certain fundamental human
rights norms that were included in the UDHR and which are
viewed today as forming the bedrock core of human rights
law.
The UDHR was drafted in two years, between January
1947 and December 1948. The UN Commission on Human
Rights supervised the drafting process, including the incor-
poration of comments from Member States of the UN,
before submitting the draft text to the General Assembly.
The General Assembly reviewed the UDHR draft text very
thoroughly, with the fifty-eight Member States voting a
total of 1,400 times on virtually every word and every clause
of the text. In the end, the UDHR was adopted unanimously
by the General Assembly on 10 December 1948 (with eight
abstentions).74
The UDHR contains many provisions which are relevant
to the events of 1948 and the forcible  displacement of
habitual residents of Palestine (and Israel’s subsequent re-
fusal to repatriate them). The Trusteeship proposal, if
adopted, could have avoided the phenomenon of forcible
displacement and refusal to repatriate. The articles of the
UDHR that are most relevant to the 1948 fact-pattern
include the following:
Article 13:
(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and resi-
dence within the borders of each State.
(2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his
own, and to return to his own country.
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Article 9: No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention
or exile.
Article 15:
(1) Everyone has the right to a nationality.
(2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor
denied the right to change his nationality.
Article 17:
(1) Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in
association with others.
(2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.
Article 21:
(1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his
country, directly or through freely chosen representatives.
. . .
(3) The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of
government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine
elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall
be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.
Article 29:
. . .
(2) In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be
subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely
for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the
rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just require-
ments of morality, public order and the general welfare in a
democratic society.
(3) These rights and freedoms may in no case be exercised
contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.
Article 30: Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as
implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any
activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of
the rights and freedoms set forth herein.
Article 7: All are equal before the law and are entitled without
any discrimination to equal protection of the law. All are entitled
to equal protection against any discrimination in violation of this
Declaration and against any incitement to such discrimination.
Article 2: Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set
forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such
as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opi-
nion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.
“Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of political,
jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to
which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-
selfgoverning or under any other limitation of sovereignty.” [em-
phasis added]75
V. Conclusion
In conclusion, the legal value of the U.S.-proposed Trus-
teeship Agreement must be viewed in the international law
context in which it was drafted.
First, the U.S. Trusteeship Agreement succeeded to, and
expanded upon, the concept of “trust” and “trusteeship”
that it had inherited from the League of Nations’ mandate
system. Thus Britain had fiduciary duties to the local, indi-
genous population of Palestine, which were breached. It
was the responsibility of the international community to
remedy this breach. The Trusteeship Agreement held the
potential to remedy that breach. It held out the very real
possibility of forestalling the outbreak of interstate violence
on 15 May 1948 and of bringing about a peaceful transition
from mandate to Trusteeship in Palestine. For these reasons
alone, it should have been adopted.
Second, the Trusteeship Agreement conformed with im-
portant norms of international law that had been enshrined
in the Charter of the United Nations, as well as in the
UDHR, which was well into the final drafting stages when
the U.S. proposed Trusteeship for Palestine and was passed
a mere nine months later. Compared to the crude Partition
Plan proposed by the General Assembly – which blatantly
violated fundamental norms of both the Charter and the
UDHR –the U.S.-proposed Trusteeship agreement confor-
med exceptionally much better with the fundamental
norms expressed in both documents. It is indisputable that
the norms of the Charter were binding upon all states at the
time. The norms of the UDHR were, if not binding in a
technical sense, at least evidence of a growing consensus
that states should respect human rights and not abuse them,
and especially not on a mass scale.
In conclusion, the U.S.-proposed Trusteeship Agree-
ment had the potential to avoid or reverse the mass forcible
displacement of Palestinian refugees in 1948 and Israel’s
subsequent refusal to repatriate them. Fifty-four years of
forcible displacement and exile might have been avoided
for one of the world’s largest and longest-standing refugee
population groups. It is to be regretted that this peaceful
transformation of Palestine to Trusteeship was subverted.
Perhaps, however, the Trusteeship Agreement can serve
as a guidepost for a peaceful future solution for the Pales-
tinian refugees, one where habitual residents are allowed to
choose the option of voluntary return to their homes of
origin, even after a fifty-four-year absence, and one where
government is designed to be for the benefit of all its
citizens. The value of the Trusteeship Agreement in the
context of the current search for a negotiated settlement
between the Israelis and Palestinians is that it conformed
with fundamental norms of the UN Charter and emerging
human rights law that were recognized to exist in 1948. It
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not only conformed with these norms but it serves as an
important historical confirmation and evidence of the ex-
istence of these norms. These norms have only been
strengthened in the intervening passage of time since 1948.
Thus these norms could, and logically should, be used as
baseline starting points if one were proposing to undertake
the design of a legal settlement of the Palestinian refugee
question that would conform with international law.
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General Assembly… may make recommendations to the
Members of the United Nations or to the Security Council or
to both….”); art. 11 ¶ 1 (“The General Assembly … may make
recommendations … to the Members or to the Security Coun-
cil or both”); art. 11 ¶ 2 (“The General Assembly … may make
recommendations with regard to any such questions to the
state or states concerned or to the Security Council or to
both….”); art. 14 (“…the General Assembly may recommend
measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation, regar-
dless of origin, which it deems likely to impair the general
welfare or friendly relations among nations….”).
21. On  24 February 1948, the  U.S. representative  stated in a
Security Council debate on Resolution 181 the U.S. view that
UN General Assembly resolutions are recommendatory and
have “moral force” only, but cannot be considered legally
binding. Therefore, the U.S. representative stated, the UN
Charter “does not empower the Security Council to enforce a
political settlement made pursuant to a recommendation of
the General Assembly.” UN SCOR, 3d year, 253d mtg., p. 267,
February 24, 1948, UN Doc. S/PV/253 (1948).
22. See “UN Land and Demographic Statistics,” supra note 19, at
304.
23. See “Partition Resolution,” supra note 18, which contains the
following “savings clauses”:
Part I, Section B “Steps Preparatory to Independence,” Para-
graph 10: The Constituent Assembly of each State shall draft
a democratic constitution for its State and choose a provi-
sional government … The Constitutions of the States shall
embody Chapters 1 and 2 of the Declaration provided for
in section C below [Chapter 1 being on “Holy  Places,
Religious Buildings and Sites” and Chapter 2 being on
“Religious and Minority Rights”] and include, inter alia,
provisions for: (a) Establishing in each State a legislative
body elected by universal suffrage and by secret ballot on
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the basis of proportional representation… (d) Gua-
ranteeing to all persons equal and non-discriminatory
rights in civil, political, economic and religious matters and
the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms,
including freedom of religion, language, speech and publi-
cation, education, assembly and association.);
Part I, Section C “Declaration,” “General Provisions”: “The
stipulations contained in the Declaration are recognized as
fundamental laws of the State and no law, regulation or
official action shall conflict or interfere with these stipula-
tions, nor shall any law, regulation or official action prevail
over them.
Part I, Section C “Declaration,” Chapter 2 “Religious and
Minority Rights”:
(1) Freedom of conscience and the free exercise of all forms
of worship, subject only to the maintenance of public order
and morals, shall be ensured to all.
(2) No discrimination of any kind shall be made between the
inhabitants on the ground of race, religion, language or sex.
(3) All persons within the jurisdiction of the State shall be
entitled to equal protection of the laws.
(4) The family law and personal status of the various mi-
norities and their religious interests, including en-
dowments, shall be respected.
(5) Except as may be required for the maintenance of public
order and good government, no measure shall be taken to
obstruct or interfere with the enterprise of religious or
charitable bodies of all faiths or to discriminate against any
representative or member of these bodies on the ground of
his religion or nationality.
….
(8) No expropriation of land owned by an Arab in the
Jewish State (by a Jew in the Arab State) shall be allowed
except for public purposes. In all cases of expropriation full
compensation as fixed by the Supreme Court shall be paid
previous to dispossession.
Part I, Section C “Declaration,” Chapter 3 “Citizenship, In-
ternational Conventions and Financial Obligations”:
(1) Citizenship: Palestinian citizens residing in Palestine
outside the City of Jerusalem, as well as Arabs and Jews
who, not holding Palestinian citizenship, reside in Palestine
outside the City of Jerusalem shall, upon the recognition of
independence, become citizens of the State in which they are
resident and enjoy full civil and political rights. Persons over
the age of eighteen years may opt, within one year from the
date of recognition of independence of the State in which
they reside, for citizenship of the other State, providing that
no Arab residing in the area of the proposed Arab State shall
have the right to opt for citizenship in the proposed Jewish
State and no Jew residing in the proposed Jewish State shall
have the right to opt for citizenship in the proposed Arab
State. The exercise of this right of option will be taken to
include the wives and children under eighteen years of age
of persons so opting….[emphasis added].
24. See, e.g., B. Morris, The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Prob-
lem, 1947-1949 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1987).
25. “Report by the Policy Planning Staff on Position of the United
States with Respect to Palestine, January 19, 1948" (1976) 5
Foreign Relations of the United States 1948 546 at 549, 553.
Michael Cohen reports that “George Kennan, head of the
recently formed Policy Planning Staff, observed that the United
Nations had not clarified certain problems concerning the
legality of partition [emphasis added],” citing a 19 January
1948 memorandum by Kennan on this topic. See M. J. Cohen,
Palestine and the Great Powers: 1945-1948 (Princeton, New
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1982) at 346 [hereinafter
“Palestine and the Great Powers”].
26. Paragraph 33 of the (top secret) 19 January 1948 Policy Plan-
ning Staff memo reads: “We [the U.S. government] should
oppose referring to the International Court [of Justice] the
question of the U.N. recommendation on Palestine on the
grounds that the fundamental issue, i.e., whether the two
communities involved will cooperate to make the partition
plan effective, is not a proper question for the Court.” See M.
J. Cohen, ed., The American Trusteeship Proposal 1948, vol. 38
in a series titled “The Rise of Israel: A Documentary Record
from the Nineteenth Century to 1948 – A Facsimile Series”
(New York & London: Garland Publishing, 1987) at 22 [he-
reinafter “American Trusteeship Proposal”]. It should be no-
ted here that the proper question to have been submitted to
the International Court of Justice was not “whether the two
communities would have cooperated” with partition, but ra-
ther “whether partition itself was legal under international
law.” The first formulation is a question of mere speculation,
upon which the court would not likely have passed judgment
anyway. The second formulation is an important question of
international law, which should have been heard by a compe-
tent adjudicator.
27. Foreign Relations of the United States 1948, vol. 5, p. 801 (1976).
UN SCOR, 3rd year, 271st mtg., 19 March 1948, UN Doc.
S/PV.271, 31; New York Times (20 March 1948) A2.
28. “Charter of the United Nations,” supra note 4, art. 75.
29. See The Jewish Agency for Palestine, Memorandum on Trus-
teeship for Palestine: Observations on a Temporary Trusteeship
for Palestine as Proposed by the United States (April 5, 1948)
(submitted to the special sessions of the UN General Assembly
convened at the recommendation of the U.S. to discuss the
political future of Palestine on 16 April 1948) [hereinafter
“Jewish Agency Memorandum”].
30. Id. Following is the text of the fifteen points contained in the
“Digest”:
Digest of United States Trusteeship Plan as Released to the
Press and Published April 6 [1948]:
(1) A temporary trusteeship agreement for Palestine should
be without prejudice to the rights, claims or position of the
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parties concerned or to the character of the eventual poli-
tical settlement.
(2) The agreement should be of indefinite duration. How-
ever, it should be subject to prompt termination whenever
the Arab and Jewish communities of Palestine agree on the
future government of their country.
(3) The trusteeship agreement might designate the United
Nations itself as the administering authority, and the res-
ponsibility for this should be placed in the Trusteeship
Council of the United Nations. Administrative, legislative
and judicial powers, should be exercised in Palestine through
a separate body called “the Government of Palestine.”
(4) The temporary trusteeship agreement could include
many of the features already developed by the Trusteeship
Council for its draft statute for the proposed International
Territory of Jerusalem.
(5) The Government of Palestine should be headed by a
Governor General who would be appointed by and respon-
sible to the Trusteeship Council.
(6) The Government of Palestine should include a cabinet
and a democratically elected legislature, preferablybi-cameral.
(7) The trusteeship agreement should provide for the
maintenance of law and order within Palestine. The Go-
vernment of Palestine should be responsible for law and
order within Palestine through its locally recruited policy
and volunteer forces under Article 84 of the Charter of the
United Nations.
When the forces of the Government of Palestine are
insufficient for this purpose, then the Governor General
should be authorized to call upon such states as would be
specified in the agreement to assist in the maintenance of
security in Palestine. A separate protocol to the trusteeship
agreement would be concluded which would contain an
undertaking by those named to accept the responsibility on
specified conditions.
(8) The Government of Palestine should be enabled under
the agreement to take over on a temporary basis existing
arrangements in Palestine pending the establishment of the
organs specified in the agreement.
(9) The agreement should make specified provisions for
immigration and land purchase. This should be negotiated
in consultation with representatives of the Jewish and Arab
communities.
(10) The standard of living in the public services under the
temporary trusteeship should be such as to be supported
by the resources of Palestine itself, and large United Na-
tions subsidies should not be expected.
(11) The expenditures which arise in connection with the
employment of forces of members of the United Nations
to assist in the defense of Palestine and the maintenance of
law and order should be defrayed by those members who
are supplying the forces.
(12) The United Nations itself should pay the salaries of the
principal officials, such as the Governor General and Chief
Justice, and possibly others.
(13) Should the General Assembly on the recommendation
of the Trusteeship Council believe that it was necessary to
raise funds in addition to those required for normal pur-
poses by the Palestine Government, these additional funds
should be supplied as subsidies, or as recoverable loans
from the United Nations. These would be advanced on the
same basis as contributions to the budget. Such a Palestine
budget should be handled by the United Nations as a
separate budget.
(14) The trusteeship agreement should contain adequate
guarantees for the safeguarding of the holy places.
(15) The temporary trusteeship should terminate as soon
as a majority of the members of each of the two principal
communities in Palestine has agreed upon a plan of govern-
ment. The Governor General should take all steps possible
to bring about such an agreement.
31. See, e.g., Palestine and the Great Powers, supra note 25, and
especially Chapter 13; American Trusteeship Proposal, supra
note 26; United Nations, Yearbook of the United Nations 1947-
1948 (New York: UN Dept. of Public Information, 1948), also
available in excerpted form on the UNISPAL website.
32. See  “Jewish  Agency Memorandum,” supra note 29, Para-
graphs 12-14.
33. See “Jewish Agency Memorandum,” supra note 29 at 9, con-
taining the Jewish Agency’s comments on the notion of elec-
toral democracy:
The provision for a “democratically elected legislature” is
the gravest feature of the entire [Trusteeship] proposal, and
raises disquieting questions as to its intentions. This provi-
sion appears to involve the application of majority rule to
Palestine as a whole, and to ignore the dual character of its
national composition. The most widely accepted principle in
the Palestine question is the irrelevance of formal democracy,
based on majority domination, to a country composed of
two separate nations which do not hold the ends of life in
common or agree on the central purposes of the state. In
such conditions, to apply democracy to the population as
a whole is to deny it to the Jews entirely, by subjecting them
to minority status. The essence of the Palestine question lies
in the need to apply self-determination not to a fictitious
single entity, but to the two separate groups, so that each is
free and sovereign within the widest limits compatible with
the freedom and sovereignty of the other. [Emphasis added.]
34. See “Jewish Agency Memorandum,” supra note 29 at 12. The
Jewish Agency noted that the Trusteeship’s proposed principle
of majority rule logically “must operate against the authoriza-
tion of any substantial immigration or land purchase by Jews.”
The Jewish Agency viewed this with alarm, due to the “inse-
parable connection between the concepts of Jewish statehood
and Jewish immigration.”
35. Id.
36. See Palestine and the Great Powers, supra note 25 at 350.
37. In late January 1948, U.S. Col. Harold Hoskins warned “that if
the United States helped implement partition, either indirectly,
or with its own troops, Middle East oil supplies to the West would
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be cut drastically, and its action might ‘without exaggeration,
be the spark that lights the fire of World War Three’,” cited in
Palestine and the Great Powers, supra note 25 at 348.
38. See “Jewish Agency Memorandum,” supra note 29. Paragraph
13 of the memorandum describes the “spectacular impetus to
this partition tendency” which occurred in Palestine since 29
November as a process of British withdrawal from “certain
zones” and Jewish “assertion of authority” in those zones. The
Memorandum, which is addressed to the United Nations,
naturally does not go into detail regarding the practices of the
Yishuv militias’ military campaigns against Palestinian popu-
lation centres – which have been so aptly documented by
Israeli historian Benny Morris, among others – but instead
refers to the results of those campaigns:
13.The disintegration of the Mandatory regime since No-
vember 29 has given a spectacular impetus to this partition
tendency, both in its functional and its territorial aspects.
As the Mandatory relinquishes an essential governmental
service in the Jewish area, the Jews begin to operate it. As the
Mandatory virtually evacuates a certain zone, Jewish autho-
rity asserts itself. There are large populated areas of the
country, both Jewish and Arab, in which the writ of the
central administration does not run at all. The degree to
which this process had developed can best be appreciated
from the fact that the Jews themselves exercise full respon-
sibility in their community for the most vital governmental
function – that of defence. Meanwhile an existing tendency
of Jewish autonomy has been accentuated in every field. In
the coming days and weeks the Mandatory’s disintegration
will leave a widening vacuum in food supplies, communi-
cations, postal and telegraphic services, currency, police,
etc., etc. The Jews, anticipating chaos, have worked out
plans and prepared machinery to assure continuity and
order in the daily routine of life. The entire Jewish popula-
tion reposes its trust and obedience not in any central
government of the entire country, but in its own authorities,
on the understanding that they will set up the administration
for the Jewish State area. The provisional Jewish authorities
are already endowed with that effective internal recognition
which is the most vital test of independent nationhood
[Emphasis added].
Similarly, Paragraph 12 of the Memorandum asserts that any
prospective Trustee for Palestine would “be faced with a pro-
cess of virtual partition which has gathered such momentum
in recent weeks that not even considerable armed force could
now arrest it.” In the same vein, paragraph 14 of the Memo-
randum states: “Palestine is moving forward inexorably to-
wards Partition in a pattern of growing decentralization.”
Perhaps most revealingly, paragraph 8 contains a direct refer-
ence to the military attacks the Yishuv had been systematically
directing at the British mandatory troops, in an effort to drive
them out: “[A]ny prolongation of British rule must involve a
resumption of the ‘squalid war’ whose disastrous effects forced
the Palestine issue upon the attention of the United Nations.
The war will be all the more squalid because both British and
Jewish opinion have been recently buoyed up by the hope of
imminent separation.” This last passage appears to amount to
no less than a thinly veiled threat by the Jewish Agency that the
Yishuv would continue military attacks against any UN-appoin-
tedTrustee, inanefforttoachievepartitionthroughforceofarms.
39. SC Res. 44 (1 April 1948).
40. See “Trusteeship Agreement,” supra note 1.
41. See “Palestine and the Great Powers,” supra note 25, chapter
13.
42. “UN Trusteeship Agreement,” supra note 1, articles 20, 21, 22,
23, 24, 25, 26.
43. “UN Trusteeship Agreement,” supra note 1, articles 27, 28.
44. “UN Trusteeship Agreement,” supra note 1, articles 11, 12, 13,
14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19.
45. SC Res. 43 (1948) of 1 April 1948.
46. SC Res. 46 (1948) of 17 April 1948.
47. SC Res. 48 (1948) of 23 April 1948.
48. GA Res. 186 (S-2) (14 May 1948).
49. See SC Res. 49 (1948) of 22 May 1948; SC Res. 50 (1948) of 29
May 1948; SC Res. 53 (1948) of 7 July 1948; SC Res. 54 (1948)
of 15 July 1948; SC Res. 56 (1948) of 19 August 1948; SC Res.
61 (1948) of 4 November 1948;  SC Res. 62 (1948) of 16
November 1948; SC Res. 66 (1948) of 29 December 1948.
50. See the UNISPAL website, maintained by the United Nations.
51. See “Trusteeship Agreement,” supra note 1. The “Preamble”
reads as follows:
Preamble
Whereas the territory known as Palestine has been adminis-
tered by the United Kingdom under a Mandate confirmed
by the Council of the League of Nations; and
Whereas the United Kingdom was selected as Mandatory
for Palestine by agreement of the principal allied and asso-
ciated Powers; and
Whereas Article 75 of the Charter of the United Nations
provides for the establishment of an International Trus-
teeship System for the administration and supervision of
such territories as may be placed thereunder by subsequent
individual agreements; and
Whereas under Article 77 of the said Charter the Interna-
tional Trusteeship System may be applied to territories now
held under mandate; and
Whereas in accordance with Articles 75 and 77 of the said
Charter, the placing of a territory under the International
Trusteeship System is to be effected by means of a Trus-
teeship Agreement,
Now therefore, without prejudice to the rights, claims, or
position of the parties concerned or to the character of the
eventual political settlement, the General Assembly of the
United Nations hereby resolves to approve the following
terms of trusteeship for Palestine.
Article 5, on “Territorial Integrity,” reads as follows:
Article 5. Territorial Integrity
1. The territorial integrity of Palestine and its status as defined
in this Agreement shall be assured by the United Nations.
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2.The Governor-General shall inform the Trusteeship
Council of any situation relating to Palestine the conti-
nuance of which is likely to endanger the territorial inte-
grity of Palestine, or of any threat of aggression or act of
aggression against Palestine, or of any other attempt to alter
by force the status of Palestine as defined in this Agreement.
If the Trusteeship Council is not in session and the Governor-
General considers that any of the foregoing contingencies
is of such urgency as to require immediate action by the
United Nations, he shall bring the matter, through the
Secretary-General of the United Nations, to the immediate
attention of the Security Council.
52. “Trusteeship Agreement,” supra note 1. Articles 20 and 21 set
out the structure of the Legislature. Note that the “Senate”
would have comprised 50 per cent Jews and 50 per cent Arabs,
which is the only anti-majoritarian aspect of the political
system proposed.
Article 20. Legislature
1.The Legislature shall consist of two chambers.
2.The House of Representatives shall be composed of Pa-
lestinian citizens twenty-five years of age or older elected
from single-member districts, each of which districts shall
be a geographical unit with a population approximately
equal in number to that of every other electoral district.
3.The Senate shall be composed of thirty Palestinian citi-
zens twenty-five years of age or older elected in equal
numbers by the registered members of the Arab and Jewish
communities in Palestine. The Arab representation shall
consist of Moslems, Christians, and Druses in proportion
to their numbers in the Arab population.
4.Legislative provision may be made as to disqualification
for election to or membership in either chamber of the
Legislature resulting from loss of legal capacity.
5.Remuneration of members of both chambers of the Legis-
lature shall be determined by legislation.
Article 21. Elections to the Legislature
1.The members of both chambers of the Legislature shall
be elected by the citizens of Palestine, twenty-one years of
age and over, on the basis of universal suffrage and by secret
ballot.
2.Legislative provision may be made as to disqualification
from voting resulting from loss of legal capacity.
53. “Trusteeship Agreement,” supra note 1. The full text of Article
9, on “Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms,” reads as
follows:
Article 9. Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms
1.All persons in Palestine shall enjoy freedom of conscience
and shall, subject only to the requirements of public order,
public morals and public health, enjoy all other fundamen-
tal human rights and freedoms, including freedom of reli-
gion and worship, language, education, speech and Press,
assembly and association, and petition, including petition
to the Trusteeship Council.
2.No discrimination of any kind on grounds of race, reli-
gion, language or sex shall be made against any person in
Palestine.
3.All persons in Palestine shall be entitled to equal protec-
tion of the laws.
4.No person within Palestine may be arrested, detained,
convicted, or punished except according to legal process.
5.No person or property within Palestine shall be subject
to search or seizure except according to legal process.
6.The legislation of Palestine shall ensure that accused per-
sons shall have adequate rights of defence.
7.The legislation of Palestine shall neither place nor re-
cognize any restriction upon the free use by any person of
any language in private intercourse, in religious matters, in
commerce, in the Press or in publications of any kind, or
at public meetings.
8.Except as may be required for the maintenance of public
order, good government and public health, no measure
shall be taken to obstruct or interfere with the enterprise of
religious or charitable bodies of all faiths. No measure shall
be taken which discriminates on grounds of religion or
nationality against any representative or member of such
bodies.
9.The family law and person status of the various persons
and communities and their religious interests, including
endowments, shall be respected.
Article 32, on “Education System and Cultural and Benevolent
Institutions,” contains Paragraph 1, that reads as follows:
Article 32. Educational System and Cultural and Benevolent
Institutions
1.Education in Palestine shall be directed to the full physi-
cal, intellectual, moral and spiritual development of the
human personality, to the strengthening of respect for human
rights and fundamental freedoms and to the combating of the
spirit of intolerance and hatred against other nations or racial
or religious groups [emphasis added].
54. “Trusteeship Agreement,” supra note 1. Article 29, on “Immi-
gration,” reads as follows:
Article 29. Immigration
1.Immigration into Palestine shall be permitted, without
distinction between individuals as to religion or blood, in
accordance with  the absorptive  capacity of Palestine as
determined by the Governor-General, and shall be subject
to the requirements of public order and security and of
public morals and public health.
2.As a temporary measure, the immigration of __________
[N.B.: blank space appears in original draft text] Jewish
displaced persons per month, for a period of two years,
shall be permitted into Palestine. The selection and admi-
nistration of the immigration of Jewish displaced persons
into Palestine shall be conducted by the Governor-General
in consultation with the International Refugee Organiza-
tion and representatives of the communities in Palestine.
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55. For analysis of the international law bases of the individually
held right of return of the 1948 Palestinian refugees – including
refutation of the Israeli claim that return is barred on grounds
of “citizenship” – see, e.g., J. Quigley, “Displaced Palestinians
and a Right of Return” (Winter 1998) 39:1 Harvard Interna-
tional Law Journal 171; J. Quigley, “Mass Displacement and
the Individual Right of Return,” in British Yearbook of Inter-
national Law, Vol. 68 (1997) 65; G. J. Boling, The 1948 Pales-
tinian Refugees and the Individual Right of Return: An
International Law Analysis (Bethlehem: BADIL, 2001). For
further analysis of the right of return under international law
generally, see W.T. Mallison and S. Mallison, “The Right to
Return” (1980) 9 Journal of Palestine Studies 125; W.T. Mal-
lison and S. Mallison, An International Law Analysis of the
Major United  Nations Resolutions Concerning  the  Palestine
Question, UN Doc. ST/SG/SER.F/4, U.N. Sales #E.79.I.19
(1979); W.T. Mallison and S. Mallison, The Palestine Problem
in International Law and World Order (Essex: Longman, 1986)
174-188; K. Lawand, “The Right to Return of Palestinians in
International Law” (1996) 8:4 International Journal of Refu-
gee Law 532.
56. “Trusteeship Agreement,” supra note 1, art. 8.
57. For useful discussions of Israel’s land confiscation laws, used
to confiscate the entire land and property holdings of the 1948
Palestinian refugees, which were subsequently transferred to
exclusive use by Jewish citizens of Israel, see S. Jiryis, “Settlers’
Law: Seizure of Palestinian Lands” 2 Palestine Yearbook of
International Law 17 (1985); S. Jiryis, “The Legal Structure for
the Expropriation and Absorption of Arab Lands in Israel”
(1973) 8 Journal of Palestine Studies 82; D. Peretz, Israel and
the Palestine Arabs (Washington, D.C.: Middle East Institute,
1958); D. Peretz, Palestinian Refugee Compensation (Washing-
ton, D.C.: Center for Policy Analysis on Palestine, 1995); J.
Quigley, Palestine and Israel: A Challenge to Justice (Durham
and London: Duke University Press, 1990); G. J. Boling, “
‘Absentees’ Property’ Laws and Israel’s Confiscation of Pales-
tinian Property: A Violation of U.N. General Assembly Reso-
lution 194 and International Law,” 11 Palestine Yearbook of
International Law 73 (2000-2001).
58. “Trusteeship Agreement,” supra note 1, art. 9(2), art. 9(3), and
art. 9(5).
59. “Trusteeship Agreement,” supra note 1, art. 31.
60. See, e.g., “Trusteeship Agreement,” supra note 1. The pream-
ble specifically cites Article 77 of the Charter of the United
Nations: “Whereas under Article 77 of the said Charter [of the
UN] the International Trusteeship System may be applied to
territories now held under mandate…”
61. “Charter of the United Nations,” supra note 4, art. 73.
62. Id., art. 76(b), art. 76(c).
63. For analysis and comparative studies on the UN Trus-
teeship system, generally, see R.N. Chowdhuri, International
Mandates and Trusteeship Systems: A Comparative Study (The
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1955); J. N. Murray, Jr., The United
Nations  Trusteeship  System (Urbana: University  of Illinois
Press, 1957); G. Thullen, Problems of the Trusteeship System: A
Study of Political Behavior in the United Nations (Geneva:
Librairie Droz, 1964); E. J. Sady, The United Nations and
Dependent Peoples (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institu-
tion, 1956); C. V. Lakshmi-Narayan, Analysis of the Principles
and System of International Trusteeship in the Charter: A Study
of the Origin, Principles and Application in International Law
(Geneva: Imprimeries Popularies, 1951).
64. “Charter of the United Nations,” supra note 4, art. 1(2) (“To
develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the
principle of equal rights … of peoples…” [emphasis added]).
65. Id., art. 1(3) (“…and in promoting and encouraging respect
for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without
distinction as to race, sex, language or religion…” [emphasis
added]).
66. Id., art. 1(2) (“To develop friendly relations among nations
based on respect for the principle of … self-determination of
peoples…” [emphasis added]).
67. Id., art. 55 (“With a view to the creation of conditions of
stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and
friendly relations among nations based on respect for the
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the
United Nations shall promote: … (c) universal respect for, and
observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for
all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.”
[emphasis added])
68. Id., art. 56 (all member states of the UN “pledge themselves to
take joint and separate action in cooperation with the [UN]
Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in
Article 55.”)
69. Id., art. 1(1) (“To maintain international peace and security,
and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the
prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the
suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace,
and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with
the principles of justice and international law, adjustments or
settlement of international disputes or situations which might
lead to a breach of the peace.” [emphasis added]).
70. Id., art. 2(3) (“All Members shall settle their international
disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that internatio-
nal peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.”); art.
2(4) (“All members shall refrain in their international relations
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity
or political independence of any state, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”)
71. “Trusteeship Agreement,” supra note 1, art. 47. Article 47
reads as follows:
Article 47. Termination of Trusteeship
1. In order to enable the inhabitants of Palestine to attain
full self-government as soon as possible, it shall be the
responsibility of the Governor-General to take all possible
steps to bring about agreement between the Palestinian
Jewish and Arab communities, acting through their repre-
sentatives in the Legislature, upon a plan of government for
Palestine.
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2. This Agreement shall terminate (a) as soon as the Ge-
neral Assembly has approved a plan of government agreed
upon in accordance with paragraph 1 above and such plan
of government is established, or (b) whenever, after the
expiration of three years from the effective date of this
Agreement, the General Assembly, upon recommendation
of the Trusteeship  Council, shall agree upon a plan of
government for Palestine, which is approved by a minority
[sic] of both the Arab and Jewish communities of Palestine
by means of a plebiscite conducted by the Governor-
General.
72. “Charter of the United Nations,” supra note 4, art. 80(1)
([N]othing in this Chapter [Chapter XII, titled “International
Trusteeship System] shall be construed in or of itself to alter
in any manner the rights whatsoever of any states or any peoples
or the terms of existing international instruments to which Mem-
bers of the United Nations may respectively be parties” [em-
phasis added]).
73. “Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” GA Res. 217A (III),
UN Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948), adopted 10 December 1948
[hereinafter “Universal Declaration of Human Rights”].
74. For a detailed account of the drafting history (“Travaux Pré-
paratoires”) of the UDHR, see J. Morsink, The Universal Dec-
laration of Human Rights: Origins, Drafting, and Intent
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1999). For other
historical studies of the UDHR, including detailed commen-
taries on it, see, e.g., G. Alfredsson and A. Eide, eds., The
Universal Declaration of Human Rights: A Common Standard
of Achievement (Martinus Nijhoff, 1999); F. M. baron van
Asbeck, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Its
Predecessors (1679-1948) (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1949); A. Eide, et
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